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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a qualitative theoretical analysis 
of the variables leading to the 13 September 1993 signing 
of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization. The global and regional 
implications of the end of the Cold War and the demise of 
the Soviet Union, the Second Gulf War, and developments in 
the occupied territories culminating in the Intifada are 
examined. The end of the Cold War meant the end of 
superpower patronage and unlimited military support for 
radical regimes such as Syria and non—state actors such as 
the PLO. The Second Gulf War further eroded the position 
of the PLO, while propelling Syria into a leadership role 
in the ensuing peace negotiations begun at the Madrid 
Conference. A weakened PLO led to the dominance of Hamas 
in the occupied territories. The result of these forces 
was the 1993 peace agreement between Israel and the PLO.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The signing of the Declaration of Principles on 13 
September 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) at the White House was heralded by many 
as the end of the Arab—Israeli conflict in general, and of 
the Israeli—Palestinian conflict in particular. As events 
since that time have shown, such an enthusiastic conclusion 
may have been overly optimistic. Still, it was a watershed 
event that created much hope for an improvement over the 
status quo of the last twenty—six years.
Perhaps much of the optimism sprang from the mutual 
recognition of the actors and the involvement of radical 
regimes long perceived to be hostile toward Israel, who 
were seen as waiting for the day to come when Israel would 
finally be defeated. This long-standing Arab perception 
regarding Israel was illustrated by Hasayn Haikal, editor 
of the Cairo daily Al—Ahram, in an editorial following the 
1967 Six Day War.
There is one Arab nation which lives on a territory 
stretching from the Arab Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean and 
numbers 100 million souls. The unity of this nation is not 
a subject for debate.... At the heart of this nation a
1
2
foreign unit has been formed, in the shape of a sharpangled 
triangle.... This triangle separates the Eastern Arab 
territory and peoples from the Western Arab territory and 
peoples. In this way, Israel's geographic location forms an 
artificial island in the midst of the Arab ocean. This 
situation cannot persist no matter what extraordinary 
resources are supplied. The waves on both sides will 
continue to beat against this artificial island and in the 
course of time will wear it down until it breaks and falls 
apart and is swept away in the mighty expanse of the ocean.1
What was it that changed this perception for a few key 
actors and led to the creation of an environment conducive 
to mutual recognition and the signing of a peace agreement? 
The analysis of a conflict should begin by "...examining the 
goals of the adversaries...the focal points of their 
positions, which in turn create their collision."2 The 
focal point of the conflict between Israel and the Arabs in 
general, and Israel and the PLO and Palestinians in 
particular, is a clash for control over the same piece of 
land, "...known to the former as Israel and to the latter as 
Palestine."3
Zionists lay claim to this piece of land based on the 
belief that Jews have the right to a national home there 
because of the presence of a Jewish nation there two 
thousand years ago. Further justification is given by
^•Quoted in Michael Brecher, "The Middle East Subordinate System 
and Its Impact on Israel's Foreign Policy," International Studies 
Quarterly 13, no. 2 (June 1969): 138.
2Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Hour, trans. Lenn Schramm 
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988), 1.
3James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle 
East. 3rd ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown Higher
Education, 1990), 300.
referring to world-^vide anti-Semitism, the suffering of the 
Holocaust, and the development and modernization of a 
democratic state in the region. Many Zionists also claim 
that since the Palestinians are Arabs, they should simply 
move to one of the Arab states, Jordan being the one most 
commonly referred to. Palestinians deny the claim on the 
land by Zionists, arguing that they have owned and occupied 
it for centuries. In addition, Palestinians have refused 
to recognize a state created by colonial powers, and resent 
being made to pay for the sins of the rest of the world.4
The change in perceptions and creation of an 
environment conducive to peaceful coexistence occurred in a 
larger context than that of the local conflict over land.
In this thesis, I shall describe and explain developments 
in the peace process by examining the role of the Intifada5 
and the PLO in the global, regional, and domestic contexts 
of the move toward peace. Since 1987, the Intifada has 
placed increased pressure and demands on Israel for some 
sort of resolution to the conflict between it and the PLO. 
While the Intifada as an event, and the PLO as a major 
actor in the whole process, are important in examining the 
move toward peace, this analysis cannot concentrate solely 
on the Intifada and the PLO, however, since the interaction 
between them and each with other actors and influences must
4ibid.
5The Intifada is the Palestinian uprising in the occupied 
territories. The word "Intifada" is the English equivalent of the 
Arabic Intifadah.
be taken into account. What were the other determinants 
and influences that compelled Israel and the PLO to pursue 
peace? Answering this question requires a theoretical 
analysis of three key variables: the global and regional
implications of the end of the Cold War and demise of the 
Soviet Union, the Second Gulf War between Iraq and the 
United States—led Multinational Coalition, and developments 
in the occupied territories culminating in the Intifada.
The purpose of the analysis will be to test the proposition 
that were it not for the conjunction of these three 
variables, the signing of the Declaration of Principles 
between Israel and the PLO would not have occurred.
CHAPTER 2
A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
It is commonly accepted in political science today that 
no single grand or universal theory exists that is capable 
of explaining great changes in the world.6 The peace 
agreement between Israel and the PLO certainly qualifies as 
a major change. Without a single theory to establish the 
parameters of inquiry in describing and explaining the 
developments that led to the peace accord, it is necessary 
to employ several theories at different levels of analysis. 
This approach allows examination of the whole— the global, 
regional, and domestic contexts and actors involved— rather 
than an examination of a single actor operating at only one 
level of analysis.
Conceptualization
What were the determinants and influences that 
compelled Israel and the PLO to pursue peace? Identifying 
the determinants and influences produce concepts to be used 
as variables. These variables in turn become indicators
6Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations 
Theory (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1993), vii.
5
6subject to qualitative analysis. Identification of the 
levels of analysis and actors involved produces the 
concepts to be operationalized. They may be individuals, 
subnational groups, states, transnational groups, 
international groups or organizations with states as 
members, or the international system as a whole.7
A state, Israel, and a transnational group, the PLO, 
acted together to produce peace. Israel and the PLO then 
become the dependent variable who were influenced toward 
this end. Other "actors"— sometimes taking the form of 
historical events— operating at various levels combine as 
independent variables. They include the global and 
regional implications of the end of the Cold War and the 
demise of the Soviet Union, the Second Gulf War, and 
developments in the occupied territories culminating in the 
Intifada. The 1948 War of Independence, the 1967 and 1973 
wars, and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon may all be 
considered as antecedent variables. World pressure on 
Israel for some sort of resolution of the conflict, a need 
to break up the united Arab negotiating front they faced at 
the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, and the bargaining 
power of the parties are all alternative variables.
These variables are not strictly independent since they 
do not act autonomously from one another. They combine in
7James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending 
Theories of International Relations (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 1990), 22— 25.
a conjuncture to influence Israel and the PLO. Arranged in 
hierarchical fashion at different levels the variables can 
be employed theoretically to construct a framework for 
analysis. By operationalizing the variables in this manner 
they serve as indicators to be used in a qualitative 
theoretical analysis. This comparative analysis will test 
the proposition that were it not for the conjuncture of 
these variables, the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles would never have occurred.
Methodology
It is necessary to identify the approach in the 
presentation of the information and arguments used to test 
this proposition. Any approach proceeds from the point of 
view of the person conducting the research. This point of 
view determines how the research is conducted and this is 
"...determined by the evaluative ideas that dominate the 
investigator and his age."8
The evaluative ideas that have dominated the discipline 
of political science can be divided into three phases. The 
first was the traditional approach. It was historical, 
non-comparative, normative, conservative, and focused on 
the legal documents and institutions of government.9
8Max Weber quoted in Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations 
Theory. 2.
9See, for example, Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the 
Rule of Law. 1918— 1935 (New York: MacMillan & Co., 1936).
8
Behavioralism was the second. It was ahistorical, 
empiricist, abstract, and focused on the scientific method 
used in the natural sciences in an effort to be 
explanatory.10 This focus led to the study of topics that 
could be quantitatively measured and led to a primacy of 
method over substance. Both the traditional and behavioral 
approaches were criticized for being too conservative and 
ethnocentric. The third or current phase is the post- 
behavioral approach. This approach is both empirical and 
normative and is primarily oriented toward an 
interpretation of the Third World. It seeks to be less 
abstract, conservative, and ethnocentric with a focus on 
substance rather than method. It is radical, holistic, and 
change—oriented.11
The differences between the behavioral and post- 
behavioral approaches are the result of two distinct views 
of the world and how knowledge is perceived. When applied, 
these two views, positivism and historicism, result in 
either a behavioral orthodox approach or a post—behavioral 
radical approach, shaping the methodology used in 
conducting research.12
10See, for example, Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, Quantitative Analysis 
of Political Data (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.,
1974).
1:LSee, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and 
Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World—System (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
12Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics (Boulder: 
Westviaw Press, 1981), 63.
9
Positivist thought can be traced to the French 
Enlightenment and British empiricism. This approach 
stresses the use of natural science methods and technology 
in acquiring knowledge. Knowledge is based on objectivity 
and the observation of real experience. This sensory 
experience is independent of time, place, and circumstance. 
The mind perceives knowledge the same way regardless of 
time or place. Facts that lead to knowledge can be known 
and verified through the empirical observation of reality 
and are valid only if observed and tested.13 This is the 
foundation of behavioralism and the use of quantitative 
methods for testing theory. It is ahistorical, abstract, 
and relies on breaking down the whole into component parts 
that can be isolated and subjected to empirical testing.14
In contrast, historicist thought focuses on the whole 
of history and believes that all knowledge is essentially 
relative to time and place. It is traced back to 
Giambattista Vico and Johann Herder and is closely 
associated with the nineteenth century German theories of 
Georg Hegel and Karl Marx. This approach argues that 
knowledge based on sensory experience obtained through 
empirical observation is not objective. Prior awareness 
and bias play a part. There are a variety of views of the 
world, and the perception of knowledge changes through time
13Ibid., 62.
14Ibid., 74.
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and across cultures.15 This approach is historical, 
substantive, interdisciplinary, holistic, and relies 
principally on qualitative methods. Since knowledge cannot 
be separated from the observer, the relations of component 
parts must be examined in the context of the whole.16
My approach is radical post-behavioral in the sense 
that it is holistic, historical, interdisciplinary, and 
utili2es different theories at different levels to inform 
and shape a descriptive comparative analysis.17 This 
approach is flexible and allows an examination of several 
variables together, rather than studying each in isolation, 
using qualitative empirical methodology.
This methodology is substantive content analysis. 
Content analysis, the "...systematic counting, assessing, and 
interpreting of the form and substance of communication,"18 
produces information for use in a descriptive analysis. 
Describing the parts or relations of things is "...intended 
to provide an accurate representation of some 
phenomenon...,"19 in this case the conjuncture of several 
variables that led to the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles between Israel and the PLO.
15ibid., 62-70.
16Ibid., 74.
17Ibid., 402.
18Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political 
Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science, 3d ed. (New York:
Longman Publishing Group, 1991), 160.
19Ibid., 73.
11
The unit of measure in content analysis can be a word, 
a theme, or an item. An item is the communication itself 
taken as a whole, such as a journal article or book.20 
This is the unit of measurement I will use. Substantive 
content analysis is concerned with the substance of the 
item. Focusing on what is said gleans salient references 
and ideas used to support and inform the analysis.21 Using 
this method for descriptive analysis enables me to 
"...summarize fairly rigorously certain direct physical 
evidences of the behaviors of, and the relationships 
between, various types of political actors."22
Theoretical Approaches
Various types of political actors operating at 
different levels of analysis necessitate the use of several 
theories in order to examine the whole context since no 
single theory is capable of doing so. These different 
theories "...provide sets of reasons why facts should be 
connected in given ways and make facts useful by providing 
us with a framework for interpreting them and seeing their 
relationship to one another."23
20ibid., 162-3.
21Ibid., 164.
22 Ibid., 161.
23Ibid., 19.
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Conflict Theory
The term "conflict" generally refers to a condition 
where one group of people, united by tribal, ethnic, 
linguistic, cultural, religious, socioeconomic, or 
political traits, are opposed to or engaged in 
confrontation with another group. This occurs as a result 
of the opposing groups "...pursuing what are or appear to be 
incompatible goals,"24 such as trying to control or occupy 
the same piece of land.
Conflict, as opposition or confrontation between 
groups, involves human interaction. It does not, in this 
sense, refer to the struggle of people against their 
environment or to mere competition between them. This 
interaction as conflict may be manifest or underlying. 
Manifest conflict refers to conflict over something 
tangible such as land or some other resource. Underlying 
conflict is the psychological component of the interaction.
It may involve personal dislike, hate, prejudice, or 
distrust at the individual level, and competing ideology or 
nationalism at the group level. Manifest conflict is 
almost always accompanied by some form of underlying 
conflict and "...often cannot be resolved more than 
temporarily unless the underlying conflict is dealt 
with." 25
24Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories. 187.
25Bertram H. Raven and Arie W. Kruglanski, "Conflict and Power," 
in The Structure of Conflict, ed. Paul Swingle (New York: Academic
Press, Inc., 1970), 71.
13
Manifest conflict may occur in the form of 
international war, civil war, revolution, guerrilla 
insurgency, political assassination, sabotage, terrorism, 
seizure of hostages, strikes, popular revolt, and economic 
sanctions and reprisals. Underlying conflict can be 
manipulated through psychological warfare, propaganda, 
speeches, media reports, and pamphlets to assist or oppose 
some form of manifest conflict.26
In these various forms, conflict may be violent or 
nonviolent, controllable or uncontrollable, and subject to 
resolution depending on these and other circumstances. It 
may not be continuous or uniformly intense, fluctuating as 
circumstances and the environment change, but it is a 
recurring phenomenon common to all societies. The 
resolution of all conflict is often referred to as a 
necessity for human progress, but many social scientists 
hold the view that the "...total elimination of conflict from 
the human situation is not only impossible but undesirable, 
because conflict in some forms is a condition of social 
change and progress."27 Whether conflict is good or bad 
depends on the context in which it arises, the resources 
and values at stake, and the cost versus the gain and 
outcomes for the groups involved.
26Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories. 192.
27Ibid., 188.
14
There are usually multiple causes of conflict in its 
various forms and different theories have been constructed 
in an attempt to explain them. These theories generally 
fall into one of two categories: microcosmic and
macrocosmic. Microcosmic theories of conflict assume that 
the origins of conflict are within the person and are a 
basic part of human nature. The behavior of the individual 
leads or contributes to the behavior of the group. 
Macrocosmic theories assume that the origins of conflict 
are found in human institutions. They study conflict at 
the group level of classes, movements, collectives, 
coalitions, or other social institutions. The difference 
between the two might be described as an analysis of 
conflict based on knowledge of the individual versus 
knowledge of collective behavior.28
A microcosmic analysis of conflict proceeds from the 
presumption that the origin is related to human nature.
The key concept in this approach is aggression on the part 
of the individual. Is this aggression a result of genetic 
predisposition or is it a psychological response to 
society? According to Sigmund Freud, aggression is a 
psychological response to society resulting from 
frustration.29 Freud's concept of frustration—aggression 
was based on his notion that the basic function of an
28Ibid., 189.
29Ibid., 276.
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individual was the seeking of pleasure and avoidance of 
pain. Whenever one or both of these functions were 
blocked, the result was aggression. This aggression was 
most often directed at the external world.30
John Dollard, expanding on Freud's work in a more 
deterministic way, assumed that aggression is always a 
consequence of frustration. "The proposition is that the 
occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the 
existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the 
existence of frustration always leads to some form of 
aggression."31 Dollard believed that all forms of 
conflict— class struggle, revolt, revolution, civil war, 
etc.— manifest themselves in frustration—aggression 
tendencies.32
These tendencies resulting in aggression can be taught 
to children and passed from generation to generation. This 
socialization of aggression allows it to perpetuate and 
continue, but only if social permission is given. This 
permission, a form of socialization in itself, may take two 
forms. Rivalry, which is direct and a form of manifest 
conflict, is the first. The second is traditional 
patterning. This form of underlying conflict gives social 
permission by identifying patterns that justify or give a
30John Dollard et al., eds., Frustration and Aggression (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), 21.
31Ibid., 1.
32Ibid., 23.
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historical reason for aggression.33 The result of this 
pattern identification is a determination of who will be 
perceived as the source of the frustration and, therefore, 
the target of aggression. It is communicated through and 
reinforced by culture, ideology, and nationalism.34
Recently social scientists in general and psychologists 
in particular have been more inclined to agree with Freud 
and Dollard that the source of aggression is some form of 
frustration. This approach has been reinforced by conflict 
studies of the Third World that focus on the causes of 
revolution. Many believe that "...the high conflict 
potential of the developing areas is a function of 
frustration caused by economic deprivation."35
Macrocosmic theories approach conflict at the group 
level and often view revolts or revolutions as social 
movements. James Denfronzo defines a social movement as a 
"...persistent and organized effort on the part of a 
relatively large number of people either to bring about or 
resist social change."36 A social movement may be 
classified as either a reform or a revolutionary movement.
A reform movement seeks to change only limited aspects of a 
society without drastically changing or replacing the
33ibid., 152.
34Ibid., 158.
35Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, 282.
36James Denfronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 7.
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existing social, political, and economic institutions of 
the society. An example might be a movement the goal of 
which is to change an existing policy of a government. 
Revolutionary movements seek to extensively change or even 
totally replace existing institutions. Most use violence 
as a means of implementing this change. This violence may 
take one of the forms of manifest conflict such as 
guerrilla insurgency, terrorism, or popular revolt.37
Revolutionary movements may be further classified into 
two ideal types. A "left-wing" revolution's main goal is 
the redistribution of resources. It seeks to change or 
replace major institutions in order to alter the social, 
political, and economic relations within a society. A 
"right-wing" revolution's central aim is to restore or 
reestablish traditional institutions that have been lost.
This ideal type emphasizes maintaining social order and 
traditional authority over the pursuit of social equality 
through institutional change.38
Denfronzo identifies five critical factors that are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a successful 
revolutionary movement if they occur simultaneously. They 
are: mass frustration resulting in a popular uprising,
dissident elite political movements, unifying motivations, 
state political crisis, and a permissive world context.39
37Ibid., 8.
38Ibid., 9.
39Ibid., 10-11.
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Mass frustration resulting in popular uprisings occurs 
when a large portion of the population becomes 
discontented. Denfronzo believes this popular discontent 
is a consequence of "relative deprivation." Relative 
deprivation is the result of the gap between expectations 
and the ability to realize those expectations in the 
present society under current conditions. This may be the 
result of rapidly deteriorating economic conditions or 
standards of living, a period of economic growth followed 
by decline, military defeat resulting in occupation and 
exploitation, a perception that the current situation is 
morally wrong, or increased knowledge (and therefore 
expectations) through communication, experience, and 
education. Relative deprivation leads to popular 
discontent, popular discontent to mass frustration, mass 
frustration to mass mobilization, and mass mobilization to 
mass participation in the uprising.40
Dissident elite political movements usually emerge from 
a combination of state crisis and relative deprivation 
causing mass frustration. They are important because it is 
often elites who play a key role in forming or expanding 
and communicating an ideology to be used as an additional 
unifying motivator in support of the revolution. The 
ideology may be of any type (socialist, nationalist,
40ibid., 11.
19
religious, etc.) so long as it is successful in helping to 
mobilize mass support and participation.41
Successful mobilization of mass support and 
participation in a revolutionary movement requires a strong 
unifying motivation. This motivation often takes the form 
of nationalism. Nationalism emerges as a reaction to 
occupation, exploitation, and rule by a foreign power whose 
actions are perceived not to be in the national interest of 
the occupied. Regardless of individual or small group 
differences, "...people sharing the same language, culture, 
and historical experience who perceive that their ethnic or 
national group has been the victim of exploitation by 
another group or country can join together in an effort to 
end their domination."42
Most successful revolutions occur in conjunction with a 
state political crisis. This crisis may be a result of a 
defeat in war, natural disaster, economic depression, 
withdrawal of support from a key ally, or changes in the 
global or regional political, economic, and military 
conditions. The consequence of the crisis is that the 
state is incapable of coopting the revolutionary movement 
or of successfully ending it through the application of 
force. A state in crisis, not capable of putting down a
41Ibid., 14.
42Ibid., 16.
20
revolution but not threatened by it either, often turns to 
a negotiated settlement to end the conflict.43
The last factor Denfronzo identifies as necessary for a 
successful revolution is the existence of a permissive or 
tolerant world context. This means that foreign actors do 
not intervene in an attempt to prevent or put down a 
revolutionary movement. It may be that outside actors 
interfere or provide assistance of some sort in support of 
the revolution. During the Cold War many revolutions were 
greatly influenced and their outcomes determined by the 
presence or absence of a superpower.44
The five factors identified by Denfronzo as necessary 
for a successful revolution represent a more modern, 
detailed, and systematic version of the frustration— 
aggression proposition of Dollard. Farrokh Moshiri and 
Jack A. Goldstone formulate a theory of modern revolution 
that incorporates the same factors as Denfronzo's theory, 
bur also identify several other important characteristics.
The barriers that prevent the realization of rising 
expectations must be perceived by the collective mass as 
being illegitimate.45 All societies have barriers to 
expectations, but most are recognized as being penetrable
43Ibid., 18.
44Ibid., 19.
45Farrokh Moshiri, "Revolutionary Conflict Theory in an 
Evolutionary Perspective," in Revolutions of the Late Twentieth 
Century, eds. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 14.
21
if certain conditions are met, such as getting an education 
or working hard for promotion. Illegitimate barriers 
cannot be overcome since they are constructed or maintained 
for the sole purpose of preventing advancement. The 
perception of illegitimacy is strengthened further when the 
state responds with force to the ensuing mass uprisings. 
Force usually fails and in fact becomes a unifying 
motivator and fuels more mass frustration and uprising.
Another important component of discontent leading to 
mass frustration and popular uprising is population growth.
A surge in population growth producing a large proportion 
of youth who are discontented due mainly to economic 
factors (falling wages, rising prices, unemployment, 
underemployment) make willing participants in a popular 
uprising. This is especially true when they are 
concentrated in small urban areas and are easily 
mobilized.46 In order for mass mobilization and 
participation to be successful there must exist at the 
local community level groups, institutions, and leaders 
willing to organize and motivate participation despite the 
presence of oppressive state authority.47 Mass 
mobilization for uprising and revolution may be dependent 
upon relative deprivation, discontent, and frustration, but
46ibid., 30.
47Jack A. Goldstone, "An Analytical Framework," in Revolutions 
of the Late Twentieth Century, eds. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert 
Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 40.
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popular support for the cause is most easily catalyzed by 
seizing on an opportunity such as a spontaneous 
demonstration or a riot. Communicated through pamphlet 
literature and speeches the catalytic event is used to 
motivate and mobilize the population.48
The microcosmic conflict theory of frustration— 
aggression and the macrocosmic theory of revolution are 
useful in examining the Palestinian struggle against 
Israel. From its establishment until 1982 the PLO was 
engaged in a revolutionary movement using manifest conflict 
against Israel. Beginning in 1987 the locus of the 
Palestinian struggle moved to the occupied territories.
All five of Denfronzo's necessary factors were relevant in 
this move and it resulted in a popular revolutionary 
uprising, the Intifada.
Realist and Bargaining Theory
Realist and bargaining theory also proceed from certain 
presumptions about human nature. Realism holds the view 
that problems in the world are the "...result of forces 
inherent in human nature."49 Human nature is power hungry, 
untrusting, unmalleable, and prone to conflict rather than 
cooperation. Improvements in the world are obtained by
48Ibid., 43.
49Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among 
Nations; The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1985), 3.
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accepting these forces and working with them. Since 
conflict is inevitable, a reliance on moral principles is 
insufficient. Conflict must be managed by pursuing self- 
interests through the manipulation of power.
Self-interests are pursued and conflict managed via 
relationships among various actors through international 
politics. International politics becomes "...the effort of 
one state, or other international actor, to influence in 
some way another state, or other international actor."50 
The actors involved in international politics are viewed by 
realism as being rational in the sense that given 
particular goals they always "...consider feasible 
alternatives to achieve these goals in the light of their 
existing capabilities."51 The primary goal, or self- 
interest, is national security and the preservation of the 
state. Military and political issues dominate the agenda 
of international politics in an attempt to maximize this 
national self-interest. Referring to Niccolo Machiavelli's 
The Prince, Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi put it this 
way:
"...The security of the state is so important that it may 
justify certain acts by the prince that would be forbidden 
to other individuals not burdened by the princely 
responsibility of assuring that security. The end— security 
of the state— is understood to justify any means necessary 
to achieve that end."52
50Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, 14.
51Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 35.
52Ibid., 39.
Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson viewed the 
pursuit of national self-interest as being the pursuit of 
power. All of international politics is a struggle for 
power. How power is defined and used depends on the 
political and cultural environment of the actor, but it 
"...may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the 
control of man over man."53 In this view power dictates 
the content and nature of all social relationships, but it 
is especially important for the relations between actors in 
international politics. In international politics, the 
primary objective in peace or war is "...neither war nor 
peace but something common to both: the enhancement of the 
power of your state to resist the will of others and impose 
your will upon them, and the diminution of the power of 
others to resist your will and impose their will upon 
you."54 During times of peace the primary means of 
achieving this is through "...bargaining supported by threats 
of force."55
Bargaining is usually conducted through diplomatic 
channels and conferences. According to Morgenthau, 
diplomacy has four basic tasks:
1) Diplomacy must determine its objectives in the light of
the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit
53Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 11.
54Adel Safty, "The Arab— Israeli Balance of Power After the
Storm," International Relations XII, no. 3 (December 1994): 53.
55 Ibid.
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of these objectives.
2) Diplomacy must assess the objectives of other nations and 
the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit 
of these objectives.
3) Diplomacy must determine to what extent these different 
objectives are compatible with each other.
4) Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of 
its objectives.56
In determining and assessing objectives, their
compatibility, and the means suited to their pursuit and
the power required to obtain them, diplomacy becomes
bargaining in itself. "It seeks outcomes that, though not
ideal for either party, are better for both than some of
the alternatives."57 These outcomes reflect a common
interest to avoid a bad alternative that usually takes the
form of mutual damage and physical harm resulting from an
application of force. An application of force, however,
can also be an exercise to demonstrate bargaining power.
The potential to damage property and inflict physical harm
by violent acts is used by an actor to influence behavior,
to affect the decisions and choices made by another actor.
In this way the power to hurt is bargaining power and its
use is coercive diplomacy.58
In coercive diplomacy, "whether it is sheer terroristic
violence to induce an irrational response, or cool
premeditated violence to persuade somebody that you mean it
56Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 563.
57Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1966), 1.
58Ibid., 2.
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and may do it again, it is not the pain and damage itself 
but its influence on somebody's behavior that matters."59 
Its use entails a strategy to alter the nature of power 
relations in a conflict situation, and therefore influence 
the bargaining process and potential outcomes.60
This strategy, the "exploitation of potential force" to 
gain advantage or concessions in a conflict situation 
relies on the realist assumption that rational actors will 
consciously calculate the cost versus the gains of various 
outcomes.61 This approach also assumes that:
...Most conflict situations are essentially bargaining 
situations. They are situations in which the ability of one 
participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important 
degree on the choices or decisions that the other 
participant will make. The bargaining may be explicit, as 
when one offers a concession; or it may be by tacit 
maneuver, as when one occupies or evacuates strategic 
territory.62
Explicit bargaining takes place at a conference table.
Tacit bargaining can be ongoing and take place anywhere. 
Actors may watch and interpret each other's behavior with 
the awareness that actions are being interpreted on both 
sides. Actions are undertaken based on the expectations of 
what the other will do in reaction, and the subsequent
59lbid., 3.
60Raven and Kruglanski, "Conflict and Power," 69.
61Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960), 5.
62Ibid.
27
reaction is interpreted and leads to further action 
again.63
The distributional aspect of bargaining is where one 
actor gets more out of the deal than the other. This is 
explicit bargaining and each actor is "...guided mainly by 
his expectations of what the other will accept."64 As the 
bargaining proceeds and expectations get more complex, an 
agreement is reached when an actor makes a final concession 
because of the expectation that the other will not concede 
further. This final concession, resulting in an agreement, 
is a commitment that Thomas C. Schelling refers to as an 
"irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice."65 Usually 
the actor to make the commitment emerges with the best 
terms in the agreement, and the other is forced to make the 
best of it or lose face.
A commitment can be enhanced by the public pledge of an 
actor's reputation to it and any agreement reached. Public 
exposure to the process and public opinion concerning it 
are also crucial to the overall success or failure of 
bargaining. Public opinion and pressure are often utilized 
to derail the bargaining process. If negotiations take 
place in secret, none of the normal tactics need be used, 
and none of the normal hazards come into play. By
63ibid., 21.
64Ibid.
65Ibid., 22.
28
excluding the public both sides reduce the fear of a 
stalemate or charges of appeasement through concession.
Done in secret, the public has no knowledge of the process, 
tactics, concessions made, how they were reached, or the 
actors involved. By waiting to inform the public until 
after an agreement has been reached, the actors force all 
concerned to become participants in a done deal.66
A commitment on the part of one actor is also a tactic 
designed to leave the other with the decision of whether 
the bargaining will result in an agreement. By making a 
commitment an actor is forcing the other party in the 
negotiations to accept the terms or risk losing any 
agreement and take responsibility for the failure.67 Any
agreement, no matter how small or ambiguous, sets a 
precedent and pattern to be followed in future bargaining 
by establishing mutual expectations. This also works by 
establishing expectations on the part of the public based 
on the commitments made by the actors in any initial 
agreement.
This chapter has presented a framework for analyzing 
theoretically the conjunction of variables that led to the 
1993 peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. The 
theories presented all deal with the origins, management, 
and resolution of conflict. The analysis will be conducted
66ibid., 28-29.
67Ibid., 37.
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using this multi—theoretical approach so that an 
examination of the whole context—  rather than just a 
single actor or event—  can be used to study the influence 
of variables operating at different levels of analysis.
The microcosmic conflict theory of frustration— 
aggression and the macrocosmic theory of revolution are 
useful in examining the Palestinian struggle against 
Israel. From its establishment until 1982 the PLO was 
engaged in a revolutionary movement using manifest conflict 
against Israel. Beginning in 1987 the locus of the 
Palestinian struggle moved to the occupied territories.
All five of Denfronzo's factors: a tolerant world context,
a political crisis of the state, dissident elite political 
movements, unifying motivations of nationalism and 
religion, and relative deprivation leading to mass 
frustration and participation, were relevant and resulted 
in a popular revolutionary uprising, the Intifada. I will 
also argue that these same five factors were present and 
can help to explain the "revolutionary" peace agreement 
between Israel and the PLO.
Realist theory, with its view of managing conflict 
through the use of power to maximize the primary self- 
interest of national security, helps to explain the actions 
of Israel and Syria in their relations with each other and 
other actors. Adel Safty characterized Israel's 
international relations this way:
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There is probably no clearer example of the pursuit of power 
as an instrument of policy to impose a certain balance of 
power and accomplish political goals which would otherwise 
be impossible through international law and multilateral 
treaty channels, than that provided by the establishment and 
aggrandizement of Israel whose leaders made of war a prime 
instrument of their policy.... What Taylor said about the 
Bismarkian vision of nineteenth century Europe is applicable 
to the Arab— Israeli conflict. Citing Bismark's famous 
sentence: "The great questions of our time will not be
settled by resolutions and majority votes— that was the 
mistake of the men of 1848 and 1849— but by blood and iron," 
A.J.P. Taylor asks: "Who can deny that this is true as a
statement of fact." Certainly not the Palestinians or the 
Arabs; not even candid Israeli leaders such as Moshe Sharret 
who admitted: "I have learned that the state of Israel
cannot be ruled in our generation without deceit and 
adventurism. These are historical facts that cannot be 
altered."68
Bargaining theory, with its use of the same concepts 
and assumptions, is an extension of realist thinking. It 
sets the parameters for an analysis of the tactics used by 
Israel, Syria, and, to a lesser extent, the PLO, in the 
negotiations that led to the 1993 signing of the 
Declaration of Principles. Using this multi—theoretical 
framework, the following chapters examine and analyze the 
variables— end of the Cold War and demise of the USSR, the 
Second Gulf War, the Intifada— whose conjunction produced 
the peace agreement.
68Safty, "Balance of Power," 53.
CHAPTER 3
THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
An event such as the peace accord between Israel and 
the PLO does not occur in a vacuum. It takes place in a 
larger geopolitical environment that may help to explain 
the event. This chapter examines two of the independent 
variables: the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf
War.
The End of the Cold War
During the Cold War, international relations were
dominated by the political and ideological confrontation
between the two superpowers, the United States (US) and the
Soviet Union (USSR). This confrontation followed the basic
premises of realism, with influence and control pursued
through a manipulation of political and military power. In
places such as the Middle East, the confrontation was
pursued via arms transfers and economic aid to exploit
existing conflicts in an attempt to gain spheres of
influence in the rivalry between East and West. The
alignment of states with one side or the other was seen as
an important symbol "...of success and failure in the
31
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global competition between the United States and the Soviet 
Union."69
The primary self-interest for American action in the 
Middle East was, and is, to gain and protect access to 
energy reserves in the region. The policy goal of the US 
was to establish influence, and possibly even control, over 
those who had the energy reserves since "whoever controls 
the oil tap in the Middle East will possess sufficient 
leverage to dominate the world."70 This desire was 
reciprocated by the USSR, if for no other reason than to 
counter the US. Without invading and occupying the region, 
the only way to "control the oil tap" was to influence and 
control those regimes in possession of the tap.
Competition in this regard was merely an extension of the 
political and ideological confrontation between the 
superpowers. Former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,
Alexander Kirk, thought it made sense for the US to take 
initiative in the region to counter the USSR since "...a 
stable world order can be achieved only under the American 
system" and only the American system would "...help backward 
countries to help themselves in order that they may lay the 
foundation for real self-dependence."71
69Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty- 
First Century," International Affairs 67, no. 3 (July 1991): 433.
70Safty, "Balance of Power," 54.
71Quoted in Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 191.
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For the US, countering communist presence and expansion 
(as well as nationalist forces hostile to the USA) was 
accomplished through the support of a few key states.
Since its creation, Israel has been, and remains, a key 
strategic ally in the region. Washington viewed Israel as 
its "...unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Eastern 
Mediterranean."72 This notion came from a conclusion by 
the National Security Council in January 1958 that the 
"logical corollary" of opposition to communism and growing 
Arab nationalism that threatened US interests "...would be to 
support Israel as the only strong pro-Western Power..." in 
the region.73 Turkey and Iran under the Shah were also key 
states, each giving the US a military presence on the 
border of the USSR. With the expulsion of Soviet military 
presence, the signing of the Camp David peace agreement, 
and increased ties with the West, Egypt under Anwar Sadat 
replaced Iran after the fall of the Shah.
Soviet interest in the region is often traced back to 
traditional Russian concern over the security of its 
borders and the desire to gain naval access to the 
Mediterranean and Persian Gulf.74 William B. Quandt
72Theodore H. Friedgut, "Israel's Turn Toward Peace," in Israel 
Under Rabin, ed. Robert 0. Freedman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995),
74.
73Chomsky, World Orders, 204.
74Avraham Tamir, "The Use of Military Force: An Israeli
Analysis," in The Middle East in Global Perspective, eds. Judith 
Kipper and Harold H. Saunders (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 221—
2.
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suggests that too much has been made of this assumption. 
Quandt believes that Soviet strategic naval interests were 
best served through their presence in the Horn of Africa 
and South Yemen, where they could control shipping in and 
out of the region, and that Soviet actions in the Middle 
East were simply the result of Cold War rivalry.75
The emergence of Soviet influence in the rivalry began 
in Egypt in the 1950's with the goal of promoting "...Third- 
World neutrality in order to eliminate Western influence 
and presence there."76 The USSR became a major supplier of 
arms to, and a source of economic development for, regimes 
hostile to the US. After the Sadat initiative, Iraq (to be 
abandoned by the USSR in the Second Gulf War), Libya, South 
Yemen, and Syria were the USSR's main allies. Of these 
states, Syria was the actor to play a major role in the 
Israeli—Palestinian peace process.
Throughout the Cold War, Soviet economic, political, 
and military support was used by Syria to support and 
enhance its doctrine of strategic parity. This doctrine 
was a strategy to enable Syria to compete one on one with 
Israel following the defection of Egypt from the radical 
Arab camp. The strategy had three basic components.
75william B. Quandt, "U.S.—Soviet Rivalry in the Middle East," 
in East—West Tensions in the Third World, ed. Marshall D. Shulman 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986), 22.
76Jamal R. Nassar, The Palestine Liberation Organization: From
Armed Struggle to the Declaration of Independence (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1991), 158.
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First, arms shipments from the USSR would give Syria the 
military hardware needed to close the gap in areas where 
Israel had superiority. Between 1975 and 1982 over $4 
billion in arms was shipped to Syria by the USSR.77 This 
hardware enabled Syria to engage in limited warfare with 
Israel over territory without the prospect of outright 
defeat. Second, the increased military power of Syria 
would serve as a deterrent to possible Israeli aggression. 
Third, Syria held that no lasting peace could be achieved 
given Israel's preponderance of military power and US 
support. Increased Syrian capabilities coupled with Soviet 
support would have a positive impact on the Arab position 
and increase their bargaining power in any peace 
negotiations that might develop.78 With this increased 
power, Syria also had the capability to unilaterally derail 
any developments that did not take its own interests into 
account.
The PLO also benefited from Soviet patronage during the 
Cold War. Prior to 1967, the USSR tended to view the 
Palestinian problem as primarily a refugee problem. After 
the 1967 war and Israel's occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza, the USSR supported the PLO in its armed struggle
77Tareq Y. Ismael, International Relations of the Contemporary 
Middle East (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 190.
78Ahmed S. Khalidi and Hussein Agha, "The Syrian Doctrine of 
Strategic Parity," in The Middle East in Global Perspective, eds.
Judith Kipper and Harold H. Saunders (Boulder: Westview Press,
1991), 189-190.
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against Israel with monetary contributions, arms and 
training, and diplomatic support. The USSR had constantly 
demanded that any settlement of the Arab—Israeli conflict 
take into account and include Palestinian representation 
through the PLO. The PLO's position was strengthened 
through the legitimacy and recognition it received from the 
superpower patronage of the USSR.79
The end of the Cold War, and consequently Soviet 
support for Syria and the PLO, began when Mikhail Gorbachev 
came to power in March 1985. In a speech to the 27th 
Communist Party Congress, Gorbachev outlined his "new 
thinking" for the USSR. Historically, as the examples 
above show, the USSR had sought openings where US influence 
in particular, and Western influence in general, could be 
undermined or replaced by Soviet influence. Its support of 
nationalist forces such as the PLO, or radical regimes such 
as Syria, was used to advance its position through spheres 
of influence in an attempt to shift the balance of power in 
its favor. Gorbachev's new thinking would subordinate 
"...the promotion of revolutionary change and the advancement 
of Soviet power in the Third World areas to the pursuit of 
domestic objectives and broader foreign policy goals."80
79Tamar Weinstein, "Soviet Union," in Echoes of the Intifada; 
Regional Repercussions of the Palestinian— Israeli Conflict, ed. Rex 
Brynen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 245.
80W. Raymond Duncan and Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, Moscow and 
the Third World Under Gorbachev (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 71.
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There were four basic tenets to this new thinking.
First, the primary goal was to revitalize and restructure 
the seriously weakened USSR economy. This would 
necessitate an international environment conducive to 
economic growth through foreign investment and technology, 
so improved relations with the West and the US was needed. 
Gorbachev stressed a theme of mutual security whereby new 
Soviet policies would take into account the views and needs 
of other actors. This gave rise to the third tenet, a 
recognition that the future strength of the USSR's economy 
would be directly interconnected with the strength and 
stability of the international economic system. Fourth, 
the stability of the international economic system depended 
in large part upon political and military stability in the 
international arena. A new emphasis would be placed on 
diplomacy and the political settlement of regional 
conflicts to reduce competition and confrontation with the 
West in order to foster the more relaxed international 
environment needed for economic growth.81
One means of fostering a more relaxed international 
environment was to reestablish diplomatic ties with Israel. 
The USSR had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel in 
1967 during the Six Day War. Beginning in 1986, high level 
meetings took place between Soviet and Israeli officials 
and in 1987 a Soviet consular delegation arrived in Israel.
81Ibid., 49-52.
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The result of this exchange was the USSR's permission for 
massive Jewish emigration to Israel to begin. This was 
seen as a major step in improving relations with Israel and 
the West. 82
Concurrent with this move was pressure on radical Arab 
client states to moderate their positions in regards to 
Israel and the West. The primary recipient of this 
pressure was Syria. In April 1987 Gorbachev, in a meeting 
with Syrian President Hafez al—Asad, let it be known that 
Syrian hostility toward Israel was having adverse 
repercussions on East—West relations. Gorbachev stated 
that "reliance on military force has completely lost its 
credibility as a way of solving the Middle East conflict," 
and that the USSR would cut back its military assistance 
that had been the cornerstone of Syria's doctrine of 
strategic parity.83 These efforts by Gorbachev were 
consistent with the tenets of his "new thinking" for the 
USSR. The priority was to end Cold War competition that 
was weakening the economy and seek diplomatic solutions to 
regional conflicts that might compromise improving East- 
West relations. The result was the end of the Cold War.
For all of the USSR's clients, the end of the Cold War 
meant the end of economic assistance, arms shipments, 
diplomatic support, and even deterrence of US and Israeli
82ibid., 120.
83Weinstein, "Soviet Union," 253.
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policies and actions in the Middle East. Syria and the PLO 
were among the major losers in this reshuffling of the 
international political system.84 Many thought that the 
end of the Cold War and eventual demise of the USSR would 
signal an end to the strong support Israel had always 
received from the US, since Israel was no longer needed to 
counter Soviet influence in the area. In actuality, it 
signaled an end to any US need to influence or "...woo the 
PLO or Arab states away from the Soviet camp, extinguishing 
the old argument that only concessions to the PLO could 
prevent a pro—Moscow Middle East."85 Aside from the 
cessation of the military, political, and economic support 
Syria had received from the USSR, the end of the Cold War 
and collapse of the communist system also undermined the 
legitimacy of Asad's authoritarian one—party political 
system in Syria. The durability of authoritarian regimes 
based on secular, radical ideologies was cast into doubt, 
and "for Asad, the fate of Ceausescu, Mengistu, Castro or 
Saddam Hussein cannot be appealing."86 Asad, always 
pragmatic and intent on remaining in power, brought about a 
shift in Syrian foreign policy that sought out increased
84Robert J. Leiber, "American Hegemony, Regional Security and 
Proliferation in the Post—Cold War International System,"
Contemporary Security Policy 16, no. 1 (April 1995): 2.
85Barry Rubin, Revolution Until Victory? (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1994), 178.
86Bradford R. McGuinn, "The Perils of Conventional Wisdom: A
Reassessment of Syrian Options," Global Affairs 8, no. 1 (Winter 
1993): 149.
40
ties and cooperation with the West to counter the absence 
of Soviet support. This new approach resulted in Syrian 
participation in the Second Gulf War and an even greater 
role in the peace negotiations that followed.
The Cold War competition between the US and USSR in the 
Middle East for spheres of influence followed the basic 
assumptions of realist thought. Human nature is power 
hungry, untrusting, and prone to conflict rather than 
cooperation. Managing this inevitable conflict between 
East and West was done by pursuing self-interests through 
the manipulation of power. Gaining client states and the 
ability to influence the political, economic, and military 
conditions of the Middle East enhanced each actor's power 
in the region. Manipulating this power allowed the USSR to 
pursue its goals of securing its southern borders and 
gaining access to warm water passages and military bases in 
the region. Manipulating this power allowed the US access 
to the abundant energy reserves of the region. For both 
actors, these goals, or self-interests, were seen as vital 
to their national security and the preservation of their 
respective states.
A change occurred when Gorbachev came to the conclusion 
that the crumbling Soviet economy could no longer support 
the USSR's Cold War competition with the West. If the 
power was no longer available to "resist the will of others 
and impose your will on them," then a new approach was 
needed. This also followed the realist assumption of a
rational actor considering feasible alternatives in light 
of existing capabilities. This new approach consisted of 
improving ties with the West, including Israel, and cutting 
ties with client states such as Syria, in order to foster a 
more stable and peaceful international environment that 
would produce Western investment and technology to assist 
the failing Soviet economy. Gorbachev's goal was still the 
primary goal of realist thought, to preserve the Soviet 
state before it completely collapsed. Former clients such 
as Syria and the PLO were also forced to consider feasible 
alternatives to preserve themselves. For Syria, this also 
meant improving ties with the West to replace lost Soviet 
support. The PLO, however, turned to Saddam Hussein of 
Iraq.
The Second Gulf War
"There can be little doubt that the conflict between the un­
authorized and US— led Multinational Coalition and Iraq at 
the start of 1991, as a result of the Iraqi Ba'athist 
regime's decision in August 1990 to invade and annex Kuwait, 
has produced profound changes in the political and 
diplomatic environment of the Middle East...."87
For the US, multinational action against Iraq was a 
necessity due to the fact that Iraq was set to control one 
of the major oil producing states in the Persian Gulf.
87George Joffe, "Middle Eastern Views of the Gulf Conflict and 
its Aftermath," Review of International Studies 19, no. 2 (April 
1993): 177.
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Secondary reasons included the opportunity to diminish 
Iraq's military capability that threatened the balance of 
power in the region, and an opportunity to establish 
American military presence in the Gulf to counter the 
growing influence of resurgent or radical Islam, now 
commonly perceived as replacing communism as the greatest 
threat against American interests in the region.
For Arab states such as Syria, recently deprived of 
Soviet patronage, the Second Gulf War was an "...opportunity 
to take sides with the West at a moment when the United 
States needed Arab political support."88 As payment for 
its cooperation, Syria received between one and two billion 
dollars from the Gulf states for participating in the 
Multinational Coalition. Syria also stands to benefit even 
more in the long term through improved economic and 
political ties with the West. In addition, with American 
support, Syria was able to end the civil war in Lebanon and 
put in place there a government compliant with its views.89 
Most importantly, by cooperating with the West, President 
Asad was able to guarantee that Syria would be a key player 
in the peace process that was promised to follow Desert 
Storm.
For the PLO, "the 1990—91 Gulf crisis resulted in one 
of the worst setbacks for the Palestinians in modern
88Volker Perthes, "Incremental Change in Syria," Current History 
92, no. 570 (January 1993): 24.
89Joffe, "Middle Eastern Views," 197.
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times."90 The thriving Palestinian community in Kuwait was 
destroyed and the financial and diplomatic support the PLO 
received from the Gulf states was cut off. Between 1980—90 
it is estimated that the PLO received around ten billion 
dollars in direct contributions from the Gulf states. As a 
result of world recession and declining oil revenues, the 
annual amount had fallen at the time of the war to around 
133 million dollars, but this was still a great loss of 
revenue for the PLO.91 The PLO also lost the tax revenue 
it had received from Palestinian workers in Kuwait which 
was estimated to be fifty million dollars a year. The 
defeat of Iraq also left Yasser Arafat and the PLO 
completely isolated politically and diplomatically, no 
longer able to benefit from what had been unanimous Arab 
support of the PLO in the Palestinian cause and an 
international consensus regarding the need for Palestinian 
self-determination. These were the most important 
weaknesses leading the PLO to enter secret negotiations 
with Israel.
The PLO position was a direct consequence of the end of 
the Cold War. Massive Jewish immigration to Israel and 
increased settlement construction coupled with the failure 
of PLO diplomatic initiatives and loss of Russian support
90Philip Mattar, "The PLO and the Gulf Crisis," Middle East 
Journal 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 31.
91Louise Leif, "A New Beginning," U.S. News & World Report. 13 
September 1993, 30.
44
caused Arafat to seek out a powerful Arab ally that might 
influence Israel and the West in favor of the PLO. Arafat, 
in allying himself and the PLO with Iraq in the Second Gulf 
War, made the same mistaken assumptions that Saddam Hussein 
did. Arafat believed that the US would probably not go to 
war with Iraq over oil, and if they did, that "...Iraq would 
either win or the United States would get bogged down in 
the desert."92
At a January 1991 rally in Baghdad shortly before the 
bombing started, Arafat said, in effect, if the US wants 
war then bring them on: "Then I say welcome, welcome,
welcome to war...Iraq and Palestine will be together side by 
side in battle."93 A month later, at it again, Arafat 
proclaimed that "if they want to have O—I—L, then they have 
to also take P—L—0," and he called for military attacks on 
Israel.94 The PLO's pro—Iraqi position would continue even 
after the defeat of the Iraqi army, as exemplified by this 
statement from the PLO's Unified National Leadership of the 
Uprising in the occupied territories.
Sister Iraq remains steadfast in the face of the most brutal 
attack [ever carried out] on a people in modern history.
Its courageous people and army have succeeded in thwarting, 
boldly and in the twinkling of an eye, the attempts to 
destroy Iraq's ability, its liquidation at the hands of the
92Mattar, "The PLO and the Gulf Crisis," 37.
93Rubin, Revolution. 183.
94lbid.
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Zionist imperialist interests in the region, and its
subjugation as an American satellite.95
The PLO's position, and its championing of Iraq, were 
reflections of popular Palestinian sentiment in the 
occupied territories. Palestinians were growing 
increasingly frustrated over the harshness of the Israeli 
response to the Intifada and the inability of the Intifada 
to produce tangible results. More than 800 civilians had 
been killed since the uprising began and Jewish immigration 
and settlement was skyrocketing. Israeli polls showed that 
52 percent of Jewish Israelis supported the expulsion of 
the Palestinians and the annexation of the occupied 
territories in order to preserve the "...Jewish and 
democratic nature of the state...."96
An unscientific telephone poll conducted in the West 
Bank revealed that 84 percent of Palestinians considered 
Saddam Hussein a national hero, 58 percent supported the 
invasion of Kuwait, and 83 percent approved of Arafat's 
support of Hussein.97 The primary reason for this popular 
support was Hussein's support of the Palestinian cause by 
attempting to link any settlement of the Kuwait crisis with 
a comprehensive settlement of the Arab—Israeli conflict,
95Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones: Communiques
from the Intifada Underground (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University
Press, 1994), 188.
96Mattar, "The PLO and the Gulf Crisis," 39.
97Ibid., 40.
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including the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied 
territories as a precursor to Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
Equally important, howpver, and a source of popular 
sentiment for Hussein throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa, was Hussein's willingness to stand up to the West 
and the US and the near unanimous condemnation by Muslims 
of Western military presence on the land of Islam. Most 
people viewed the conflict as a "...hypocritical double 
standard in US behavior."98 While the US moved quickly and 
forcefully against Iraq in support of United Nations 
resolutions, the US had done nothing against Israel in 
support of numerous United Nations resolutions condemning 
Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights, 
and Jerusalem, not to mention the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. 
The preferred outcome for the PLO in particular and 
Palestinians in general was some sort of resolution that 
accepted Hussein's linkage.
Saddam Hussein's proposed peace initiative of 12 August 
1990, linking his withdrawal from Kuwait to the withdrawal 
of Israel from the occupied territories was mostly a ploy 
to divert attention from his own occupation, but it had the 
effect of striking "...a blow for Palestinian liberation 
without doing a great deal to accomplish it. But by 
explicitly shifting focus to the Arab—Israeli conflict and 
restoring the question of Palestine to pride of place, he
98ibid., 39.
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was, on another level, tapping into deep springs of Muslim 
concern."99 This would have important repercussions in the 
occupied territories where the Islamic Resistance Movement, 
Hamas, was already eclipsing the PLO even prior to its loss 
of support and funding from the Gulf states. The Islamist 
sentiment toward Israel's occupation of the territories is 
reflected in this statement by Shaikh Abd al—Aziz Bin Baz, 
a religious scholar in Saudi Arabia: "The Palestinian
problem is an Islamic problem first and last.... Muslims 
must fight an Islamic jihad (holy war) against the Jews 
until the land returns to its owners."100
The failure thus far to achieve any Arab or Palestinian 
victory against Israel is seen by Islamists to be a result 
of Israel sticking to its Jewish religion, while secular 
Arabs and the PLO have been unsuccessful due to their 
abandonment of Islam as a way of life. Iraq's failure has 
been attributed to the same cause. Islamists viewed the 
Second Gulf War as an excuse for the US to put forces on 
the ground and occupy Muslim land. Even if done to protect 
energy reserves at the request of Gulf states, they see it 
as a violation of the integrity of Islam.101 Stating that
"James Piscatori, "Religion and RealPolitik: Islamic Responses
to the Gulf War," in Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, ed. 
James Piscatori (New York: The American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, 1991), 5— 6.
100Ibid., 6.
101Ghassam Salame, "Islam and the West," Foreign Policy 90 
(Spring 1993): 28— 29.
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"America has become your God," Safar al—Hawaii, Dean of 
Islamic Studies as Umm al—Qura University in Mecca, 
chastised Persian Gulf Muslims for putting their faith in 
the US rather than in God.102 An Imam at a Riyadh mosque, 
echoing this feeling, asked: "If a dog has come onto your
land, would you invite a lion to get rid of it?"103
These convictions were echoed throughout the Muslim 
world, but had a particular resonance in the occupied 
territories where Hamas and the PLO had been competing for 
the loyalty of the Palestinian people. Hamas, although 
vocal in its opposition to Western presence in the region, 
never came out in support of Iraq despite popular sentiment 
in Hussein's favor. By limiting its attack to the US,
Hamas was able to tap into the strong anti-Western mood of 
the population without alienating the Gulf states on which 
it also depended for funding. The devastation of PLO 
finances as a result of their loss of Gulf funding caused 
the PLO to drastically cut back services and payments to 
Palestinians in the occupied territories. This cutback is 
estimated to be almost as much as the annual funding the 
PLO lost. Hamas, in contrast, by taking the tack it did, 
was able to preserve its funding, estimated at 100 million 
dollars annually from the Gulf states, 60 to 70 million of 
that from Kuwait alone. As a result, Hamas stepped into
102Piscatori, "Religion and RealPolitik," 9.
103Ibid.
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the void left by the PLO and significantly increased its 
popularity and loyal following in the occupied territories, 
directly challenging the PLO for representation of 
Palestinians. Israel perceived a stronger Hamas, coupled 
with growing Islamist influence and anti-Western sentiment 
across the region, as an even greater threat than the PLO 
had been. Syrian leadership on behalf of the Arab states 
at the Madrid Peace Conference following the war presented 
Israel with a unified Arab negotiating front attempting the 
same sort of linkage that Hussein had. Peace with Syria 
and Israel's other Arab neighbors would be reached through 
a comprehensive framework and settlement, with a basic 
condition being the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied 
territories. These positions were untenable for Israel in 
pursuing its foremost interest, the security of the Jewish 
state. What was needed was an entirely new strategy, one 
that would deal with all of these problems at once. The 
PLO would provide the answer.
In terms of realist thought, the manipulation of power 
by the US that led to the defeat of Iraq strengthened 
American influence and presence in the Middle East and 
guaranteed that its primary self-interest— access to the 
abundant energy reserves of the region— would not be 
threatened. It also established a balance of power in the 
region favorable to the US that might help it in combating 
Islamic Fundamentalism, seen by many American officials as 
replacing communism as the greatest threat against American
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interests. For actors such as Syria, this event confirmed 
that the best alternative in light of existing capabilities 
would be to improve ties with the West. Besides replacing 
lost Soviet patronage, it would give Syria far greater 
influence and bargaining power in the peace negotiations 
that followed the end of the war.
This chapter has presented an analysis of the influence 
of two of the independent variables: the end of the Cold
War and demise of the USSR, and the Second Gulf War. While 
the end of the Cold War was cause for change in the 
approach of some actors toward the Arab—Israeli conflict, 
in itself it was not responsible for the conflict.
It is not true that the Arab— Israeli conflict is simply a 
reflection of the Cold War. Such a view has been maintained 
in the past by both Arabs and Israelis, for it enabled both 
sides to diminish their responsibility. The Cold War did 
not create the conflict but, rather, aggravated it.104
The end of the Cold War meant the end of flexibility for 
some actors. With independent non-alignment now a thing of 
the past, there was no longer the ability to maneuver back 
and forth playing the superpowers against one another.
There was a significant "...awareness that Arab options over 
regional affairs had been significantly reduced by the 
decline of Soviet influence as the Cold War came to an 
end."105
104Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Hour, xvii.
105Joffe, "Middle Eastern Views," 183.
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For actors such as Syria, the end of the Cold War meant 
the end of superpower patronage and "...that the source of 
the almost inexhaustible military support for the Arabs has 
now dried up, and the source of almost automatic political 
support for their cause has also run low."106 For the PLO, 
the end of the Cold War meant that "in the space of a few 
short years, almost the entire culture into which the PLO 
was born and by which it was nourished has disappeared," 
and in the process "...deprived the PLO of a major moral and 
material patron and a kind of echo chamber for the PLO's 
old anti—imperialist rhetoric."107
Prior to the end of the Cold War, unilateral moves on 
the part of the US were curtailed because of fear of a 
Soviet response there or somewhere else in the world. Now 
the US was able to act to make things such as the Second 
Gulf War happen in accordance with its own interests.
Soviet interest in fostering peaceful coexistence with the 
West in order to help its flagging economy led to 
cooperation in executing Desert Storm and in setting up the 
peace negotiations that followed. Russia co—chaired the 
opening rounds of the Madrid Peace Conference, and its 
presence made it easier for former clients such as Syria to 
participate while lessening the perception back home that
106Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace, ed. David Landau (New York: 
Random House, 1995), 276.
107Daniel Williams, "Dateline Tunis: PLO RIP?" Foreign Policy 90 
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the whole affair was the US's doing.108 In reality, Syrian 
presence was also the result of the US's initiative to 
develop a framework for the conference that would include 
all the principal actors (except the PLO) in an effort to 
set the foundations for a comprehensive peace process and 
reward those Arab states who had participated in the 
coalition against Iraq. Israel was unable to object to the 
presence of longtime radical foes such as Syria who had 
participated in the diminution of Iraq's military power, 
since the outcome was seen as being more beneficial to 
Kuwait than Israel.
The outcome of the Second Gulf War also had the effect 
of depriving the PLO of its backup patron following the end 
of the Cold War. Saddam Hussein's pledges on behalf of the 
PLO and the Palestinian struggle to liberate the occupied 
territories "...reawoke the old Palestinian dream of finding 
an Arab knight on horseback to liberate historical 
Palestine from the Zionists."109 In the end, PLO support of 
this knight would lead to no patronage at all and the 
costly loss of its funding from the oil—rich Gulf states. 
Coupled with a growing tide of Islamic radicalism in the 
whole region, the effect of PLO losses was to increase 
Islamist gains in the occupied territories, a development 
detrimental to both the PLO and Israel. "Israel had
108Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," 
International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992— 93): 130.
109Williams, "Dateline Tunis," 161.
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countenanced, if not encouraged, the first organizational 
efforts of Hamas in the Gaza area, on the grounds that it 
would be a counterforce to the PLO."110 This strategy 
proved to be seriously flawed in the long run as Hamas, in 
conjunction with other radical Islamist movements, proved 
to be a much greater security risk for Israel than the PLO 
had ever been.
All of these various factors, emerging as influences 
due to the independent variables, led Israel and the PLO to 
look for a new strategy to solve their mutual problems.
This strategy would take the form of bargaining in secret 
to produce the September 1993 peace accord. For Israel, 
this tactic produced results while staying within its 
realist framework of protecting, and in this case even 
enhancing, its security. If there were any final lessons 
gained from the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf 
War, they are probably best summed up by India's Foreign 
Minister who said, "the lesson of the Gulf War is not to 
fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons."111
nOpriedgut, "Israel's Turn Toward Peace," 75.
1:11Leiber, "American Hegemony," 4.
CHAPTER 4
THE LOCAL CONTEXT
The Arab struggle against Israel began even before the 
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. In the 
1960's however, the struggle took on new meaning, and new 
looks, due in large part to the leadership of President 
Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Nasser called a summit 
conference of Arab heads of state in Cairo from January 13— 
16, 1964 to address Arab concerns over Israel's plan to 
divert water from the Jordan River for irrigation projects 
within Israel. It was at this conference that Nasser 
proposed the formation of a "Palestinian entity" to 
represent Palestinian interests in the Arab struggle 
against Israel.112
Arab reaction to this proposal was mixed. Amin al— 
Hafez, President of Syria, "...actually suggested making the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip the territorial domain of a 
Palestinian state."113 This was the first time that these 
areas were proposed as being the place for any sort of
112Brecher, "Middle East Subordinate Systems," 134.
113Nassar, Palestine Liberation Organization, 20.
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Palestinian autonomy. King Hussein of Jordan worried that 
any organized Palestinian activity seeking a state might 
jeopardize the stability of Jordan owing to its large 
Palestinian population, and also undermine Jordan's control 
over the West Bank. King Saud called for establishing a 
Palestinian government in exile. The leaders of Tunisia 
and Algeria advocated the formation of a Palestinian 
national liberation movement, which would be the eventual 
result of Nasser's proposal. Nasser, however, came to view 
the Palestinian movement as competition for leadership in 
the struggle against Israel and had really only wanted the 
"symbolic creation of a limited official institution with 
propaganda functions only."114
The official statement of the conference recommended 
that:
Mr. Ahmad al—Shukairy, Palestine's representative at the 
Arab League, should resume contacts with the member states 
and with the Palestinian people for the purpose of 
establishing a sound basis for organizing the Palestinian 
people in order to enable them to assume their duties in 
liberating their homeland and determining their destiny.115
On 24 February 1964 in Jerusalem, al—Shukairy announced 
that a draft constitution of twenty—nine articles had been 
written and included the basic principles for Palestinian 
liberation. In May of the same year, a Palestine National
114Ibid., 20.
115Ibid.
Council (PNC) of 422 Palestinians selected by committees 
from the Palestinian populations of the various Arab states 
met in Jerusalem to discuss the draft constitution. On 1 
June 1964, the PNC announced the following decisions:
1) Proclaimed the existence of the PLO.
2) Elected Ahmad al—Shukairy as the first chairman of the 
Executive Committee of the PLO.
3) Elected Abdul Jaleed Shuman as chairman of the Palestine 
National Fund.
4) That it had transformed itself into the First National 
Congress of the PLO.
5) Authorized the chairman to select an executive committee 
of the PLO consisting of fifteen Palestinian 
representatives.116
This marked the official beginning of organized Palestinian 
resistance against Israel, a development due in large part 
to a younger generation of Palestinians "...dedicated to the 
principle that national liberation can only be achieved by 
armed struggle. "117
This struggle would be transformed again following the 
1967 Six Day War in which Israel captured and occupied the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, considered now to be the 
territorial base for any Palestinian autonomy, in addition 
to the Sinai and the Golan Heights. For Israel, these 
moves were seen as necessary in order to guarantee its 
security. As a result of the war, Israel acquired control 
over territory three times the size of the state before the 
war started and gave it more defensible borders. Yitzhak
116ibid.
117lbid., 1.
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Rabin, Israeli Chief of Staff during the war, described 
Israel's new borders as essential to security because the 
"present borders run along natural barriers: Egypt— the
canal; Jordan— the Jordan River, a less impressive barrier 
than the Suez Canal but nevertheless a barrier; and with 
Syria, there will no longer be a need to climb up 
mountains."118 The newly acquired territory was now a 
strategic asset for Israel, and not one that it wanted to 
give up.
The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza galvanized 
Palestinian resistance. Prior to the war, the PLO under 
al—Shukairy had pursued a strategy of regular military 
warfare against Israel to be carried out in large part by 
the Arab states. The Arab defeat marked a shift in PLO 
strategy toward guerrilla insurgency and terrorism as the 
principal form of resistance. This shift occurred in 1968 
when Arafat's Fatah faction, George Habash's Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Na'if 
Hawatima's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(DFLP), entered the PLO. In 1969, Arafat was elected 
Chairman of the Executive Committee, a position he still 
holds today. From their point of view, the only 
appropriate method of resistance to the Israeli occupation
118Quoted in Brecher, "Middle East Subordinate Systems," 138.
58
was an armed struggle using guerrilla insurgency and 
terrorism.119
The PLO's guerrilla operations and terrorist attacks 
were generally carried out from bases outside the occupied 
territories. Prior to 1971 Jordan was the base for the PLO 
until being ousted from there in what was basically a civil 
war between the PLO and King Hussein. The PLO then moved 
to Lebanon until being driven from there as well in 1982 by 
Israel. Operating outside of the occupied territories, the 
PLO did not have much of a following or any institutional 
representation in the territories until after the October 
197 3 Arab—Israeli war. The Rabat Arab Summit's declaration 
that the PLO would be the "sole, legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people," and Arafat's appearance before 
the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 elevated the 
status of both the PLO and Arafat and gained them an 
increased following and loyalty in the territories. In 
1973, the PNC established the Palestine National Front 
(PNF) in the occupied territories to give the PLO 
institutional representation and allow it to play a larger 
role in local Palestinian politics.120
This increased presence and influence in the 
territories coupled with the increasing international
119Joshua Teitelbaum and Joseph Kostiner, "The West Bank and 
Gaza: The PLO and the Intifada," in Revolutions of the Late
Twentieth Century, eds. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and 
Farrokh Moshiri (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 306.
120Ibid., 307.
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legitimacy of PLO policies and actions was cause for 
concern on the part of Israel. In 1982, Israel invaded 
Lebanon, the location of PLO headquarters and its military 
base, in an attempt to crush the PLO. Israel felt that if 
it were successful in eliminating the PLO, "...it could, with 
far less resistance, implement its plans for the occupied 
territories...."121 Former Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
education officer Mordechai Bar—on wrote in the October 
1982 issue of New Outlook that "there is no doubt that the 
central aim was to deal a crushing blow to the national 
aspirations of the Palestinians and to their very existence 
as a nation endeavoring to define itself and gain the right 
to self-determination."122
The effect was just the opposite of what the Israelis 
had hoped for. The war in Lebanon, which was supposed to 
destroy the PLO and its infrastructure and in doing so, 
deprive Palestinians in the territories of their legitimate 
representative, only led to increased support for the PLO 
and a strong surge in Palestinian nationalism. Mayors from 
towns in the territories and the Supreme Islamic Council of 
Jerusalem even went so far as to send letters to the United 
Nations reiterating their recognition of the PLO as the 
only representative of the Palestinian people and pledged
121Don Peretz, Intifada; The Palestinian Uprising (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990), 19.
122Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States,
Israel, and the Palestinians (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 203.
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their continuing support for the organization in its 
struggle against Israel.123 With the defeat and ouster of 
the PLO from Lebanon, Palestinians in the occupied 
territories, while continuing to support the PLO, began to 
realize that liberation was not forthcoming and started 
paying more attention to their own conditions and what 
might be done about them.
The Intifada
Conditions in the occupied territories had been 
steadily declining since occupation in. 1967. During the 
first twenty years of the occupation, Israel had 
requisitioned nearly half the land in the West Bank and 
one—third of the land in Gaza for Jewish settlement and 
usage.124 This loss of land meant the loss of the 
agricultural economic base upon which the territories had 
been dependent. It was a part of the overall Israeli 
policy to prevent the development of an independent 
Palestinian economic base and infrastructure and promote 
dependence upon Israel. Palestinians were a source of 
cheap labor for Israel and provided an immediate market for 
Israeli goods.
Palestinian labor in Israel, while giving Palestinians 
the currency to buy Israeli goods, was also a source of tax
123ibid., 205.
124Peretz, intifada. 9.
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revenue. Between 1967—87 more than one billion dollars 
were deducted from the wages of workers for unemployment 
benefits for which they were not even eligible. An 
additional 800 million dollars in taxes were collected, 
representing two and a half times the total investments 
made by Israel in the occupied territories over that same 
period.125 This outward flow of resources, coupled with a 
decline in employment both in Israel and the Gulf states, 
led to an economic slowdown and a two percent annual 
decline in the standard of living of Palestinians.126 
Combined with increases in education and a population 
explosion, the economic problems greatly contributed to 
relative deprivation and mass frustration.
The overall population in the occupied territories grew 
by just over fifty percent in the period between occupation 
and the outbreak of the Intifada. This increase led to a 
much larger proportion of young people. By 1985, one—half 
of the population in the occupied territories was under the 
age of fourteen, and one—third was between the ages of 
fifteen and thirty—four.127 In Gaza, sixty percent of the 
population was under fifteen years of age, and two-thirds 
of the total population was male.128 The increasing
125Bill and Springborg, Politics in the Middle East. 330.
126Tietelbaum and Kostiner, "West Bank and Gaza," 303.
127Ibid.
128Sara Roy, "The Gaza Strip: Past, Present, and Future,"
Current History 93, no. 580 (February 1994): 68.
population and decreasing land due to Israeli acquisition 
also greatly increased the density. The Jabalya refugee 
camp in Gaza for example, has a population density of 
133,400 people per square mile, over twice the density of 
Manhattan in New York. Israel, by comparison, has a 
population density of eighty people per square mile.129
The increases in population were paralleled by 
increases in education. After 1967 seven universities 
opened in the occupied territories. In the 1970's there 
were only 1000 students attending a university. By the 
early 1980's there were 7,500 university students in the 
occupied territories. By the end of the decade there were 
10,000 in the West Bank alone, with 4000 graduates per 
year.130 Less than fifteen percent of these graduates were 
able to find employment commensurate with their 
qualifications. In 1985 there were 4000 unemployed 
university graduates. By the time of the outbreak of the 
Intifada that number had more than doubled.131 This gap 
between education and expectations and actual employment 
opportunities coupled with frustration over the continuing 
occupation "...nourished a climate of political radicalism" 
that was easily transformed into militant action.132
129lbid.
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131Ibid., 4.
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The occupied territories had a history of civil 
disobedience even prior to the outbreak of the Intifada.
The first mass demonstration in the occupied territories 
was started by students in December 1968 and lasted for 
four months. In 1974 another demonstration occurred; it 
lasted for two weeks and marked the first time that the IDF 
imposed a curfew on the occupied territories in order to 
control the population and put down the demonstrations.
The largest, longest lasting, and most violent 
demonstration prior to the Intifada occurred in 1976. In 
February the West Bank had violent demonstrations and 
general strikes in protest over an Israeli court ruling 
that allowed Jews to pray at the al—Aqsa Mosque. In July 
more demonstrations broke out to protest an increase in the 
sales tax and then continued through the end of the year.133
In December 1986, following the deaths of two students 
killed in clashes at Bir Zeit University, the occupied 
territories erupted in mass demonstrations that lasted for 
ten days. On 18 May 1987 six members of the Islamic Jihad 
movement escaped from Gaza central prison and on August 8 
assassinated an officer of the IDF in Gaza.134 In September 
a Palestinian stone—thrower was killed by the IDF. On 
October 1, three Palestinians were killed trying to run a 
roadblock by the IDF, and later that week five more were
133Nassar, Palestine Liberation Organization, 39.
134Mishal and Aharoni, Speaking Stones. 25.
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killed in a shoot-out with the IDF.135 On December 8, an 
Israeli citizen was stabbed to death in a Gaza market. On
December 9, rioting broke out in the Jabalya refugee camp 
after four residents were killed and another seven injured 
in a traffic accident near the Erez checkpoint which was 
rumored to be an Israeli act of revenge for the stabbing 
victim. This incident marks the official beginning of the 
Intifada. The next day, massive riots and demonstrations 
broke out all over Gaza and eventually spread to the West 
Bank as well.
While the immediate source of the Intifada might have 
been a traffic accident, "the root causes of the uprising 
were embedded in twenty years of Israeli occupation and 
Israeli policies aimed at undermining the material and 
national existence of the Palestinians in their own 
land."136 Generally translated in the West as "uprising", 
the literal meaning of Intifada is "shaking off",137 in this 
case, the shaking off of the colonial style occupation of 
the Israelis. "Unlike classical patterns of colonialism, 
the Israeli occupation failed to win the sympathy or
135Helena Cobban, "The Palestinians: From the Hussein—Arafat
Agreement to the Intifada," in The Middle East From the Iran-Contra 
Affair to the Intifada, ed. Robert 0. Freedman (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 1991), 249.
136ziad Abu—Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 53.
137Williams, "Dateline Tunis," 162.
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support of any meaningful sector of the occupied 
population."138
In fact, not only were they not willing to support it, 
a growing number of Palestinians were willing to die in the 
fight against occupation. In the first three months of the 
Intifada 111 Palestinians were killed and another 1000 
wounded.139 The majority of these dead and wounded were 
young men who were followers of one of the Islamist 
movements.
The Influence of Hamas
The Islamist movements in the occupied territories all 
emerged from local chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
oldest and strongest of all Islamic groups. The Muslim 
Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 to promote a 
return to Islamic values and society with the goal of 
establishing an Islamic state in order to combat the 
growing influence of Western powers in the region.140 This 
goal is echoed by all the Islamist groups who argue "...that 
the cause of all political, economic, and social conflicts 
engulfing the world today lies in the absence of this 
state."141
138Abu—Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 53.
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During the first ten years of Israeli occupation Islam 
did not constitute much of a unifying motivator for 
resistance. Toward the end of the 1970's a local chapter 
of the Muslim Brotherhood emerged in Gaza under the 
leadership of Shaikh Ahmad Yasin.142 Prior to the Intifada 
the Brotherhood refrained from violent confrontation with 
Israel and concentrated instead on establishing political 
and social welfare networks in Gaza. Yasin's movement, the 
Islamic Assembly, was successful in making inroads into a 
majority of the local mosques and gained control over 
administrative and student groups at the Islamic University 
in Gaza. These moves were encouraged by Israeli 
authorities who saw increased Islamic influence as 
decreased support for the PLO and its secular revolt.143
The Brotherhood, which emphasized that the way to 
change society was to reform the individual, would 
eventually be transformed by the emergence of a second 
Islamic movement. Membership in this second movement 
consisted of ex—Brotherhood members who felt that the 
Brotherhood was not confrontational enough in its approach 
to Israel. This rival movement, bolstered by members from 
the religious wing of Arafat's Fatah, called for jihad
142Jean Francois Legrain, "A Defining Moment: Palestinian
Islamic Fundamentalism," in Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf 
Crisis, ed. James Piscatori (New York: The American Academy of Arts
and Sciences, 1991), 72.
143F. Robert Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other
Means, rev. and exp. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993), 34.
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against Israel and advocated violent attacks against the 
IDF and Jews. This new approach signaled the beginning of 
the implementation of Islam as an ideology and unifying 
motivator in the resistance against Israeli occupation.144 
The movement eventually became known as the Brigades of 
Islamic Jihad, or Islamic Jihad, and they were responsible 
for the attacks against Israeli forces mentioned previously 
that set the stage for the Intifada.
The Brigades of Islamic Jihad were violently crushed 
and their leaders deported by the IDF in the first few 
months of the uprising. Out of this leadership vacuum the 
Islamic Resistance Movement, known by its Arabic acronym 
Hamas, emerged in February 19 8 8.145 Initially Hamas 
recruited individuals from the Brotherhood, but a few weeks 
later the Brotherhood "formally adopted Hamas as its 
militant arm."146 Hamas assumed the Islamic Jihad's 
principle of armed struggle against Israel and the 
Brotherhood was transformed from a political and social 
movement into a revolutionary one. Hamas operated 
separately from the secular factions, who reported to the 
PLO's umbrella Unified National Leadership of the Uprising 
(UNLU). The UNLU was established by the PLO shortly after 
the Intifada began to capitalize on the uprising and 
attempt to gain some control over it.
144Legrain, "A Defining Moment," 72.
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Hamas was critical of the UNLU, and of the PLO in 
particular, because "it is an organization that does not 
serve God," only its own leadership.147 Hamas was also 
adamantly opposed to any sort of negotiated settlement and 
continued to expound the principle of armed struggle to 
overthrow the state of Israel and establish an Islamic 
state in its place. Hamas published a list of things the 
PLO would need to do before it could be accepted by the 
Islamist movement. These things included the following:
1) The PLO must renounce every commitment it has 
made...especially as regards the political solution or the so- 
called peaceful solution.
2) The PLO must extricate itself from the international 
political efforts that all world powers are making....
3) The PLO must oust from its ranks every group belonging to 
those...regimes...or international powers.
4) The PLO must reorganize itself, so that it becomes a 
resistance movement, not a political organization....
5) The PLO must forget the battle for its own interests....
6) The PLO must go back to view the Palestinian issue as an
issue of occupied territories and a refugee people, and not 
an issue of leaders devoting themselves to agreements and 
disagreements....
7) The PLO must consider itself the representative of all
the Palestinian people, including those who adhere to Islam
and who are committed to it.
8) The PLO must include in its fold every son of the Islamic 
nation, and must consider all Islamic movements that are 
committed to Islam its strategic depth in its battle for 
civilization.148
Even with the criticism from Hamas, the PLO and its 
UNLU were able to control the Intifada and command the 
loyalty of the majority of the population for the first few 
years of the uprising. That control would begin to crumble
147Abu—Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 29.
148Ibid., 50.
in 1990, and totally collapse following the Second Gulf 
War. In 1990 two incidents took place that greatly 
elevated the stature of Hamas. The first was the killing 
of seven Palestinian workers and the wounding of ten others 
in an attack by a single Israeli settler in May. Mass 
rioting followed, with another seven killed and 500 wounded 
in clashes with the IDF. The second occurred in October at 
the esplanade of al—Haram al—Sharif, the location of the 
al—Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock. Clashes there 
produced twenty—one dead and 150 wounded and was followed 
by a strict curfew. In the aftermath, Hamas was successful 
in arguing to the Palestinian people that these incidents 
showed that "...our fight with Zionism is a fight between 
Islam and Judaism."149
Hamas called for an even more radical approach and an 
escalation in violent attacks against the IDF and Jewish 
settlers. The PLO was hesitant to support anything like 
this, since it would hurt its status in the international 
arena, particularly with the US with whom it was trying to 
establish a dialogue for possible negotiations. As a 
result, the PLO was discredited in the eyes of many 
Palestinians and lost support. After these incidents,
Hamas was thought to have the loyalty of more than 50 
percent of the Palestinian population.150 The resulting
149Legrain, "A Defining Moment," 83.
150Ibid.
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conflict between Hamas and the PLO eventually led to direct 
confrontations between followers of the two groups in the 
territories. Recognizing that such conflict played into 
the hands of the Israelis and would eventually destroy the 
Intifada, the PLO and Hamas agreed to coordinate policies 
through joint committees. Hamas ended up controlling these 
as well and virtually eclipsed the PLO as the main actor in 
the occupied territories.
Apart from its loss of funding and international 
stature as a result of the Second Gulf War, the eclipse of 
the PLO was furthered by its support of a negotiated 
settlement that would give it some autonomy in the occupied 
territories. Hamas had long held that all of Palestine was 
Muslim land, that Israel has no right to exist, and that 
"...no one has the right to concede any part of Palestine and 
[Hamas] considers any political settlement that leaves 
Israel intact a matter of treason."151 This stance coupled 
with a deteriorating economy in the occupied territories 
and the absence of PLO monetary support only increased 
frustration, and led to growing support for Hamas which was 
"...expressed in increased mosque attendance and in the 
spread of Islamic norms and dress codes."152 For Israel, 
this growing support meant that it would face greater 
numbers of increasingly hostile Palestinians in the
151Abu—Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism. 23.
152Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising, 265.
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occupied territories. When combined with Hamas's principle 
of refusing to negotiate with Israel, Israeli officials 
found it virtually impossible to orchestrate any kind of 
settlement that would bring about a peaceful resolution to 
the Intifada. A new approach was needed that would 
neutralize Hamas and its influence in the occupied 
territories, and that approach would be to pursue separate 
and secret negotiations with the PLO.
The Intifada experience is best explained by the 
revolutionary conflict theory presented in the second 
chapter. Demographic expansion brought a significant 
increase in the proportion of young people in the 
population. Continued occupation and expanding Jewish 
settlements, increased education and decreased employment 
opportunities, and an overall economic decline contributed 
to relative deprivation resulting in mass frustration and 
participation in the uprising. A dissident elite political 
movement to motivate the masses emerged in Hamas, which 
also presented Islam as the principal unifying motivator 
for the Intifada. The state crisis took the form of 
colonial occupation by Israel that was seen as unjust and 
immoral by the Palestinians. A permissive and tolerant 
world context was created by worldwide media reports 
sympathetic to the Palestinian struggle for self- 
determination .
The struggle was not without cost however. By the end 
of September 1990, 861 Palestinians had been killed and
101,500 wounded since the beginning of the Intifada. Later 
that year the IDF reported that it had arrested 70,000 
Palestinians and deported 65 since the uprising began.153 
The Intifada upset Israel's preponderance of power over the 
occupied territories and was very costly in both political 
and financial terms. It forced Israel to recognize that it 
could neither continue the occupation in its present form 
nor annex the occupied territories as many conservative 
Israeli leaders had hoped to do. The success of the 
Intifada reflected the fundamental law that any colonial 
occupation can only "...be defended and maintained 
successfully as long as the benefits a colonial power 
derives from the colonized exceed the costs."154
The decline of the PLO and its loss of support in the 
occupied territories was a dream come true for many 
Israelis. The ascension of Hamas to take the place of the 
PLO, however, was a nightmare for those responsible for the 
security of Jewish settlers and the safety of the IDF in 
the occupied territories. With Hamas's more radical 
approach and advocacy of violent attacks on soldiers and 
settlers alike, the IDF found it could do nothing except 
wait for the next attack to happen. This scenario created 
the necessity for some new tactic to deal with Hamas and
153Legrain, "A Defining Moment," 81.
154Ibrahim Abu—Lughod, "Introduction: On Achieving
Independence," in Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, eds. Jamal
R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 7.
the escalating violence in the occupied territories. The 
tactic would be the same as Israel's response to the 
environment created by the end of the Cold War and the 
Second Gulf War, a secret deal with the PLO, which in this 
case would relieve Israel of the responsibility of dealing 
with Hamas and place that in the hands of the PLO. For the 
PLO, its decline and eventual eclipse by Hamas necessitated 
a separate deal to rescue it from irrelevance. This 
outcome reflects the importance of the influence of the 
Intifada, the third independent variable, in the creation 
of an environment that led to the 1993 peace accord between 
Israel and the PLO.
CHAPTER 5
THE MOVE TOWARDS PEACE
The Madrid Peace Conference, co—chaired by the US and 
Russia, began on 30 October 1991. The framework for 
negotiations agreed to at the conference was for the US to 
host a series of bilateral meetings bringing together 
Israel with Syria, Lebanon, and a joint delegation 
representing Jordan and the Palestinians of the occupied 
territories. The purpose of the talks between Israel and 
the Arab states would be to work out separate peace 
treaties. The Israeli and joint Jordanian—Palestinian 
meetings would set the parameters for a phase of self-rule 
in the occupied territories to last five years. Within 
three years of the beginning of the five year period, 
negotiations for a final settlement of the occupied 
territories would begin. The Palestinian delegation, 
without Jordan as agreed to in Madrid, held eleven meetings 
with Israeli officials in Washington during 1992 and 
1993.155
155Rubin, Revolution. 190.
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These negotiations quickly bogged down, largely due to 
Syrian pressure that all Arab negotiations with Israel be 
coordinated so that Israel was faced with a united Arab 
bargaining front that would produce a comprehensive 
settlement beneficial to all the Arab parties. The PLO, 
although able to advise the Palestinian delegation, was for 
all intents and purposes left out of the process. They 
were under pressure, however, not to derail the 
negotiations as the Gulf states had promised to renew PLO 
funding if a settlement were reached between Israel and the 
Palestinians. This put the PLO in an awkward position, 
summed up by one PLO official as being "between the options 
of suicide and suicide."156
Arafat was worried that any deal made between Israel 
and the Palestinian delegation would leave the PLO 
completely out and virtually ensure its extinction. During 
its almost thirty year history the PLO had employed a 
variety of strategies, ranging from guerrilla warfare and 
terrorism to seeking the patronage of Saddam Hussein to 
supporting the Intifada, none of which had produced 
tangible results. If a deal were to be made, Arafat wanted 
some sort of solution that would put him and the PLO in 
charge of any self-rule arrangement in the occupied 
territories. The turning point for the PLO was the June
156ibid., 187.
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1992 election of a Labor Alignment government in Israel 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and 
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Rabin and Peres had run on 
a peace platform and promised that some sort of agreement 
with the Palestinians would be made concerning the occupied 
territories. In 1993 the Israeli Knesset repealed a law 
barring any Israeli contact or dialogue with the PLO, and 
officials from the Labor Alignment began meeting with PLO 
officials.157
There were three contending Israeli military doctrines 
concerning the occupied territories following the outbreak 
of the Intifada. They were:
1) The occupied territories constitute the most important 
factor in the defense strategy for the next war. They must 
be kept under Israeli control, even if that means no peace.
Israel should adopt Kissinger's strategy that no war is 
better for Israel than no peace.
2) There should be a withdrawal from some or most of the 
territories, under specified security arrangements. This 
would include some sort of autonomy for the Palestinians.
3) The territories are a security burden; they threaten 
internal security and increase the likelihood of war. This 
doctrine does not object to the formation of a Palestinian 
state so long as adequate security arrangements are made.158
The move by Rabin and Peres to conduct a dialogue with the 
PLO was a reflection of both the second and third 
doctrines. Recognizing that the territories were becoming
157ibid., 190.
158Azmi Bishara, "The Third Factor," in Intifada: Palestine at
the Crossroads, eds. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: 
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a security burden, but rejecting the idea of an independent 
Palestinian state, they pursued a policy of allowing 
limited autonomy for the Palestinians under the realization 
that an agreement with the PLO was the "...only antidote to 
the growing Islamist radicalism among Palestinians."159
Coupled with concern over the rise of radical Islamist 
actions in the occupied territories was a concern over the 
future demographics of the occupied territories. Israeli 
demographers had concluded that "...the current generation of 
Palestinians was sufficiently large to produce a 
Palestinian majority in the next generation..." that could 
not be offset by massive Jewish immigration and would 
eventually threaten the Jewish identity of the state.160
As the dialogue with the PLO was beginning, the 
negotiations in Washington were continuing, but not to 
Israel's satisfaction. Syria continued to stress the need 
for a united Arab stand against Israel in the bargaining, 
reflecting President Asad's deeply held belief "...that any 
settlement with Israel had to be comprehensive— Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians had to sign 
together...."161 Syria's delegation to the Madrid conference 
conveyed Asad's belief by officially proposing to Israel
159Ghassan Salame, "Islam and the West," Foreign Policy 90 
(Spring 1993): 35.
160Friedgut, "Israel's Turn Toward Peace," 72.
161Michael Parks, "Giving Peace a Chance," Los Angeles Times. 14 
September 1993, 3(H).
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the "...readiness to trade 'total' peace for total 
withdrawal" from all occupied territory, including Lebanon 
and the Golan Heights.162 This essentially left Israel with 
two choices. Either continue the negotiations up against a 
united Arab front which placed a great deal of pressure on 
Israel, or pursue a separate deal with the PLO on limited 
self-government that would not place any immediate demands 
on Israel.163 Israel chose the latter. This move would 
have the added benefit of placing the responsibility of 
controlling Hamas in the occupied territories with the PLO.
Over a period of eight months, Israel and the PLO held 
a series of eighteen secret meetings, fourteen of them in 
Oslo, Norway.164 These talks were begun after the Norwegian 
Institute for Applied Science offered to facilitate them. 
Peres favored Norway because they had agreed to keep the 
negotiations secret even from the US. Norway's Foreign 
Minister, Johan Jorgen Holst, aided by four mediators and 
his wife (a Middle East specialist), hosted the meetings 
that took place in Oslo. The meetings began on 20 January 
1993 with the PLO represented by Abu Mazin, a PLO Executive 
Committee member; Abu Ala, Director General of the PLO 
Economic Department and a member of Fatah's Central
162Eliahu Salpeter, "Slow Road to Peace," The New Leader LXXV, 
no. 13 (October 1992): 9.
163Avi Shlaim, "Prelude to the Accord," Journal of Palestine 
Studies XXIII, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 18.
164Parks, "Giving Peace a Chance," 2(H).
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Committee; and Nabil Sha'th, the chair of the PNC's Central 
Committee and a Fatah Central Committee member. By May 
Peres felt enough progress had been made to bring in an 
official Israeli presence and Uri Savir, Director General 
of Israel's Foreign Ministry, arrived to continue 
bargaining on Israel's behalf.
Syria continued to play a role even in these secret 
negotiations. Whenever some impasse was reached with the 
PLO, Peres would have word passed to the PLO that progress 
had been made with Syria and Israel might conclude a "...deal 
with Syria instead of concluding the accord with the 
PLO."165 A draft agreement of the Declaration of Principles 
was reached in July, and on August 19 a final agreement was 
reached and a small signing ceremony held with Peres in 
attendance.166 Informing Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher of the agreement on August 27, Peres played the 
Syrian card again, saying that "we believe that the 
progress with the Palestinians will help to spur the 
Syrians toward progress, too."167
According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, "the conduct of 
an effective diplomacy is said to be difficult, if not 
impossible, if it must be subject, both in its conception 
and execution, to the continuous scrutiny of public
165Peres, Battling for Peace. 299.
166Rubin, Revolution, 197.
167Peres, Battling for Peace, 305.
opinion...."168 Secret negotiations for the Israeli—PLO 
accord were certainly a necessity for their success. Had 
the Islamist factions of the Palestinians, or even Syria, 
found out about the pending deal it is probable they would 
have taken measures to stop it, even if it meant getting 
rid of Arafat. In signing the Declaration of Principles, 
Arafat destroyed what was left of Arab unity and broke up 
the united Arab negotiating front put in place by Asad.
This new deal gave Israel the chance to announce a major 
breakthrough in the pursuit of Arab—Israeli peace without 
having to make any concessions. Reflecting on the 
negotiations, Yoel Singer, an Israeli Foreign Ministry 
legal advisor who took part in the talks, commented that 
the "...success in achieving the Declaration of Principles 
resulted mostly from the fact that there was no media 
coverage, and thus we had freedom to negotiate without our 
positions hardening through exposure."169
An interesting aspect of the 1993 agreement is its 
striking similarity to the tactics and outcome of the Camp 
David agreement between Israel and Egypt. The Geneva Peace 
Conference, ongoing since the October 1973 war, had 
produced no results for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. 
Feeling that "...there was a need to try a completely new 
approach which would bypass all formalities and procedural
168Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories. 111.
169Parks, "Giving Peace a Chance," 2(H).
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technicalities..." Sadat initiated secret meetings with 
Israel in an attempt to make a breakthrough.170 Sadat hoped 
that a separate agreement made directly with Israel would 
force Jordan and Syria to go along with the deal once talks 
resumed in Geneva. Sadat needed an agreement with Israel 
in order to obtain the patronage of the US. Israeli Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin
"...saw a golden opportunity 'to use every ruse to sabotage 
the peace efforts' leading to Geneva and to promote Israel's 
long-standing goal of separating Egypt from the other Arab 
states as a means of weakening Arab bargaining power and 
making it easier for Israel to hold on to the remainder of 
the occupied territories...."171
These tactics were almost identical to those of the 
negotiations that led to the Israeli—Palestinian peace 
accord and produced the same result, the removal of an 
enemy from the playing field and the split of the united 
Arab bargaining front. The agreement legitimizes the idea 
of normal relations and puts pressure on the other party to 
go along or be seen as against the concept of peace.
In negotiations such as the ones that led to the 1993 
peace accord "...agreement all too often becomes an end in 
itself."172 Arafat needed an agreement, any agreement, to
170Fred J. Khouri, The Arab— Israeli Dilemma. 3d ed. (Syracuse,
NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 401.
171Ibid., 402.
172Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1961), 189.
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reaquire legitimacy and funding in order to save himself 
and the PLO. When agreement becomes an end in and of 
itself the problems that are agreed upon "...are often 
soluble only because they are inconsequential."173 The 
Declaration of Principles makes no mention of the important 
issues in the Israeli—Palestinian conflict: the right of
return for refugees, future borders, the issue of 
settlements, the status of Jerusalem.174 Agreements such as 
this one, "...rather than contributing to a solution of the 
real issues, becomes a means of postponing coming to grips 
with them."175
The bargaining theory presented in the second chapter 
helps to explain many aspects of the negotiations that 
produced the peace agreement between Israel and the PLO.
In light of the three independent variables— end of the 
Cold War and the demise of the USSR, Second Gulf War, the 
Intifada— the parties to the Madrid Conference followed 
Morgenthau's four basic tasks of diplomacy in setting the 
stage for bargaining. Each actor determined its own 
objectives and those of the other actors in relation to the 
amount of power available to pursue them. These different 
objectives were then analyzed to determine if any
173Ibid.
174Avi Shlaim, "The Oslo Accord," Journal of Palestine Studies 
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compatibility existed, and if so, how bargaining might be 
used to reach the complementary objectives.
This process was equally important to both Israel and 
the PLO. Israel's primary objective was to prevent any 
collective Arab action that might result in the loss of 
territory that would diminish Israel's security. The 
united Arab bargaining front might also result in 
collective Arab action that would put Palestinians in the 
occupied territories in charge of limited autonomy and 
leave the PLO out of the process. This was an unacceptable 
alternative to the PLO. By pursuing a separate agreement, 
both the PLO and Israel were able to avoid these bad 
alternatives. Israel was able to take advantage of a 
weakened PLO and exploit its relative power gained after 
the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War. Without 
Soviet or Iraqi patronage, the PLO no longer had the means 
to influence Israeli action through coercive diplomacy.
The explicit bargaining that took place in secret in 
Norway allowed the PLO to make the necessary concessions to 
seal an agreement with Israel without public opinion 
jeopardizing the outcome. In waiting to announce the 
agreement until after it was completed, and publicly 
pledging their reputations on it, Rabin, Peres, and Arafat 
forced the rest of the world to go along with the deal or 
be seen as opposing a peaceful settlement to the Israeli— 
Palestinian conflict.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This thesis has presented a qualitative theoretical 
analysis of the influence of three variables— the end of 
the Cold War and the demise of the USSR, the Second Gulf 
War, and developments in the occupied territories 
culminating in the Intifada— whose conjunction produced the 
conditions that led to the 13 September 1993 signing of the 
Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO.
The end of the Cold War deprived two key actors, Syria 
and the PLO, of their superpower patron and military 
supporter and created the permissive environment needed by 
the US to lead the Multinational Coalition in the Second 
Gulf War against Iraq. Without Russian deterrence, the US 
was free to pursue whatever policies most benefited it and 
Israel. This war cost the PLO the Support of another 
patron, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and in supporting Hussein 
in his invasion of Kuwait and fight against the coalition 
forces, also the funding of the oil—rich Gulf states upon 
which the PLO had become increasingly dependent. The loss 
of both Russia and Iraq also meant that any idea of someday
defeating Israel in battle was also gone.
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The Second Gulf War also precipitated a rise in radical 
Islamic movements throughout the region, including the 
occupied territories. In the occupied territories the 
Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, seized on the PLO's 
misfortunes and expanded its own following and support 
while escalating its radical approach with increased 
violent attacks against the IDF and Jewish settlers. The 
Intifada itself had become a costly and embarrassing 
problem for Israel, only further exacerbated by the growing 
dominance of Hamas.
The conjunction of these variables produced a crisis 
for both Israel and the PLO. The Madrid Peace Conference, 
convened after the end of the Second Gulf War, put Israel 
in a position of having to pursue negotiations with a 
united Arab bargaining front. This front was led by Syria, 
now participating in the process as a result of its 
participation with the coalition forces against Iraq.
Syrian participation was also motivated by the desire to 
establish relations with the West in order to replace the 
support it had lost with the demise of the USSR.
Syrian leadership in the negotiations followed the 
principle that only a united bargaining position could 
wrest the concessions it felt were necessary for a 
comprehensive peace, mainly the total withdrawal of Israel 
from all of the occupied territories. This position was 
untenable for Israel, who felt such a move would jeopardize 
its national security, its primary self-interest in all
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policies that it pursued. The PLO, now without patronage, 
diplomatic support, or funding, found itself in the 
position of possibly being left completely out of any 
possible peace agreement and not being a party to the 
limited self-rule that was to take place in the occupied 
territories. This position was untenable for Arafat, for 
such an outcome would mean the eventual demise of the PLO 
and its leadership.
The solution to the mutual crisis of Israel and the PLO 
was to pursue the secret talks that led to the Declaration 
of Principles. This agreement saved the PLO and Arafat 
from oblivion, and enabled Israel to break up the united 
Arab bargaining front and pursue negotiations with each 
party separately, greatly increasing its bargaining power 
and the chances that it would be able to keep the majority 
of the occupied territories. All of these developments fit 
with Denfronzo's theoretical framework of revolutionary 
conflict.
The untenable positions in which both actors found 
themselves produced the frustration that led to 
participation in the negotiations, an uprising of sorts 
against the established channels of diplomacy and 
bargaining that were not producing results for either 
party, and in fact jeopardized Israeli security. Rabin, 
Peres, and Arafat participated in a dissident elite 
movement away from the official channels, and against the 
wishes of significant portions of their respective
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constituencies in order to reach an agreement. The 
unifying motivator for both Israel and the PLO was self- 
preservation. The PLO needed an agreement to reestablish 
its lost funding and to prevent its total eclipse from the 
occupied territories by Hamas, or in the case of a 
negotiated settlement with the Palestinian delegation to 
the peace talks, by local Palestinians in the occupied 
territories. Israel preserved its self-interest of 
national security by breaking up the united Arab bargaining 
front that threatened collective Arab action to take away 
significant portions of the territory it had held since 
1967. The agreement would also shift the security problem 
of dealing with Hamas to the PLO.
For the PLO, the state crisis was the loss of 
patronage and diplomatic support of first the USSR and then 
Iraq. For Israel, it was the possibility of having to give 
up territory that it felt was essential to its security in 
the face of united Arab bargaining pressure. The 
permissive and tolerant world context was created by the 
world—wide optimism that a comprehensive peace agreement 
would be achieved in the Middle East following the Second 
Gulf War. Four years of constant media coverage of the 
Intifada and the plight of the Palestinian people in the 
occupied territories also contributed to the optimism for 
an agreement.
Reaction to the peace agreement has, of course, been 
mixed. "Our salvaging the PLO today is like the United
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States propping up the Soviet Union and Communism after 
winning the Cold War," said an advisor to Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin.176 The Israeli writer Amos Oz said in a BBC 
interview shortly after the agreement was announced that, 
"this is the second biggest victory in the history of 
Zionism."177 Former Secretary of State James Baker, when 
asked in an interview as to whether or not the PLO could be 
trusted, replied that it was irrelevant since the only 
concession Israel had made was to recognize the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinian people.178
Edward W. Said, University Professor at Columbia 
University and a leading Palestinian intellectual, wrote in 
response to the accords that it showed the need for Israel 
to find a Palestinian partner in order to produce a 
settlement that it could live with and would improve its 
"...public image, which had sunk to very new lows because of 
the Intifada...."179 Said also wrote that the PLO "...has the 
distinction of being the first national liberation movement 
in history to sign an agreement to keep an occupying power 
in place."180
176Parks, "Giving Peace a Chance," 4(H).
177Quoted in Edward W. Said, The Politics of Dispossession (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1994), xxxv.
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The Israeli calculation is that by accepting the policing of 
Gaza— which Begin tried to give to Sadat fifteen years ago 
and which in 1992 Rabin and Peres said they wished would 
disappear into the sea— the PLO would soon fall afoul of 
local competitors, of whom Hamas is only one.181
The end result of this is a much weaker PLO which will be 
easier to bargain with in the future when it comes time to 
negotiate all of the final status issues.
In its competition with the PLO and its opposition to 
any negotiated settlement, Hamas has only to keep up the 
violent attacks against the IDF and Jewish settlers. In 
doing so, Hamas might succeed in discrediting both the PLO 
and the Labor Alignment government, causing Rabin and Peres 
to lose the next election. The Likud opposition has 
already announced that if it comes to power, the first 
thing it will do is to suspend the Declaration of 
Principles. This would be a victory for Hamas, and it 
could reinvigorate its struggle to overthrow Israel. Imad 
al—Falouji, a principal Hamas leader in Gaza said in an 
interview that, "Israel does not want Peace. It wants 
security, and we hold the key to that. And if they want 
their security, they have to listen to us. This is not 
peace yet."182 According to historian Richard W. Bulliet, 
"secular Muslims, with their foreign cheering sections,
181Said, The Politics of Dispossession, xxxvii.
182Serge Schemann, "For Gazans, Joy of Freedom has its Borders," 
New York Times, 25 August 1995, 1(A) and 5(A).
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will be confronting religious Muslims long after an 
independent Palestinian state comes into being, and smart 
money will not be on the secularists."183
Regardless of the final outcome, the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO was a 
watershed event in the Arab—Israeli conflict. Such an 
event cannot be studied in isolation, but must take into 
account the wider context in which it occurs. Examining 
and analyzing the variables and influences that produced an 
environment conducive to the peace agreement necessitates 
the use of a multi—theoretical approach. By applying 
different theories at different levels of analysis the 
whole context can be examined, and in doing so, produce a 
better understanding of events such as the peace agreement 
between Israel and the PLO.
183Richard W. Bulliet, "The Future of the Islamic Movement," 
Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 (November—December 1993): 40.
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